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COMMERCIALISING SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT IN 
SOUTH AFRICA
The collection of household refuse – or the lack thereof – is one of the most powerful visual benchmarks of inequality in South Africa.  Although the situation has improved somewhat since 1994, formerly whites-only suburbs are still kept immaculately clean with regular 
door-to-door refuse collection and teams of street sweepers, while most 
black township and rural area residents are forced to dump their refuse 
in open spaces or in unsealed communal skips.  Street cleaning is often 
non-existent, and where it is available workers are often unable to cope 
with the volume of uncollected waste.  As a visual indicator of change, 
solid waste management acts as a daily reminder to millions of poor South 
Africans that their health, safety, and living environments have changed 
very little in the past seven years.
Municipal governments in South Africa have been turning increasingly 
to commercialisation (i.e., privatisation, outsourcing, corporatisation) as a 
way of addressing this refuse collection backlog.  Why this has happened, 
and how successful it has been at addressing the problem, are the subjects 
of the two papers in this collection.  The first paper looks at a micro-
enterprise refuse collection programme in Khayelitsha, Cape Town, known 
as the Billy Hattingh scheme.  The second looks at the newly-corporatised 
refuse collection service in Johannesburg called “Pikitup”.  Although very 
different in their institutional make-up and size, these two initiatives are 
both driven by the same commercialisation impulse that is reshaping the 
waste management sector throughout South Africa.  The papers also offer 
remarkably similar insights into the dangers of running waste management 
‘like a business’.  
This introduction provides a summary of the findings of these two 
research reports and groups them into four themes: concerns about the 
entrenchment of a two-tiered refuse collection system; a lack of proper 
public consultation in the commercialisation process; the loss of public 
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sector skills; and the impact of service restructuring on municipal workers.
Entrenching a Two-tiered System
During apartheid public sector refuse collection resources were enor-
mously skewed in favour of historically white neighbourhoods.  In some 
cases dozens of refuse vehicles and hundreds of personnel – not to 
mention capital expenditures – were available for white suburbs while 
more heavily populated black townships were serviced by only a few 
(poorly maintained) vehicles and a handful of staff.  Not only was this 
inequitable, it was extremely inefficient, with workers and equipment in 
white neighbourhoods often sitting idle while their counterparts in black 
areas were overworked and under-resourced.
With the end of apartheid and the creation of unified, non-racial cities 
it was hoped that these resources would be more equitably and efficiently 
distributed, and indeed there has been some progress in this regard.  But 
it is evident from the two case studies provided here that relatively little 
redistribution has taken place in the refuse collection sectors in  Cape 
Town and Johannesburg and that public sector resources remain largely 
situated in white, middle-class neighbourhoods.
Outsourcing and corporatisation, it is argued here, have served to 
entrench these apartheid-era inequalities.  By placing the emphasis for 
service expansion and improvement on ring-fenced, cost recovery business 
units rather than on a redistribution of existing public resources or more 
progressive cross-subsidisation mechanisms (or, for that matter, requests 
for increased inter-governmental transfers from central state), municipal 
decision-makers in Cape Town and Johannesburg have effectively frozen 
both the quantity and quality of refuse collection services to the townships. 
In the case of the micro-enterprise refuse collection scheme in Khay-
elitsha, service levels have not improved in any meaningful way since 
outsourcing began in 1997, and the concern is that the private company 
will only provide services to the level that residents can afford (the underly-
ing premise of cost recovery).  Moreover, there is little hope of any signifi-
cant long-term structural improvement to waste management in the area 
because of the low-tech, low capital investment, and highly fragmented 
nature of micro-enterprise operations.  As a result, littering in open spaces 
remains a major problem and ‘house-to-house’ collection in the informal 
areas has been cancelled because it is deemed too difficult to manage.  
Meanwhile, suburban homes in other parts of Cape Town retain the service 
levels they have always had and most of the public resources.  In fact, 
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recent research by the Municipal Services Project found per capita ratios 
as high as 10:1 when comparing public resources available for refuse 
collection in historically white suburbs to black townships in the city.1
The distribution of public resources for refuse collection is equally 
problematic in Johannesburg, but rather than pushing for the redistribution 
of these resources, the new waste management utility will focus on cost 
recovery and the outsourcing of services in poor neighbourhoods.  More-
over, the ring-fencing of the sector will make it more difficult to cross-
subsidise from other service sectors and will make it difficult for politicians 
and citizens to intervene in the policy-making process (a fact that managers 
see as an advantage of running a more efficient ‘business unit’).  
The most immediate concern in both of these cases is the poor quality 
of services in the townships.  However, the use of enormous amounts of 
public resources to support the extravagant socio-environmental lifestyles 
of the wealthier suburbs – lifestyles that effectively depend on continued 
inequality in waste management services – is also problematic.  Middle-
class South Africans are among the most profligate users of resources and 
producers of waste in the world.  By leaving in place the infrastructure 
that makes these standards of living possible, waste management decision-
makers have given an effective ‘stamp of approval’ to continued over-
consumption. 
Lack of Public Consultation
The second major theme that arises from the case studies is the essentially 
undemocratic manner in which decisions were made to outsource and 
corporatise waste services.  In the case of the micro-enterprise scheme in 
Khayelitsha, union requests to redeploy workers from the suburbs (where 
equipment and personnel sat idle) to the townships (where they were badly 
needed) were ignored by management and no public sector restructuring 
options were explored in any detail.  Management-labour relations during 
this process became so bad, in fact, that the issue had to go to arbitration 
(a case which the union initially won but then had overturned on appeal 
by the municipality).  The one community meeting that took place in 
Khayelitsha to discuss the privatisation option with community members, 
meanwhile, was biased in favour of outsourcing due to the fact that 
the private consulting firm facilitating the meeting was also advising the 
municipality on how to outsource and the community leaders who organ-
ised the meeting were openly in favour of outsourcing.  
In Johannesburg, the decision to corporatise waste management was 
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part of a much larger plan to corporatise and privatise a series of municipal 
services in the city, but there was little scope for debate.  More tellingly, 
perhaps, is the fact that line managers within waste services appear to be 
making outsourcing decisions in an ad hoc and non-consultative manner, 
threatening the ability of the new waste management utility to operate as a 
coherent metropolitan service.  In other words, the decision to corporatise 
– as contentious as it was with municipal workers – may actually heighten 
the ad hoc and discretionary nature of service delivery decisions being 
made by management.   
The Loss of Public Sector Skills
A third concern raised in the papers is a loss of public sector skills and 
institutional knowledge.  In the case of outsourcing and privatisation, the 
loss of public skills and knowledge is very clear and direct:  a service is 
transferred to the private sector and new employees and managers take 
over.  This is particularly true in cases where contracts are short or where 
contractors go bankrupt (as is frequently the case with micro-enterprise 
operations).  In these latter cases, important knowledge about the needs 
of a community and information about best-practices is largely lost along 
with the private company – a concern that is amplified in poor urban areas 
which are the most socially complex and logistically difficult to service.  
In the case of Johannesburg, outsourcing also threatens to undermine 
the institutional memory of the waste management utility, but it is the cost-
cutting nature of the new business-like approach to refuse collection that 
threatens to reduce the skills base of the utility.  The casualisation of the 
labour force along with a general deskilling of labour through the introduc-
tion of cost-saving capital equipment has meant that refuse workers are 
less knowledgeable about the service they provide and less able to respond 
creatively to changing needs in the sector.  
The Impact of Restructuring on Municipal Workers
 The final theme taken up in the papers is the impact of commer-
cialisation on municipal workers and the labour they do.  Besides the 
obvious anxieties over job losses, most of the workers interviewed for 
these research papers expressed concern over job casualisation, short-term 
contracts, multi-tasking, and the downward pressures these developments 
are having on wages, health and safety, and job security.  Most workers 
in private refuse collection companies are earning considerably less than 
unionised municipal workers and have far fewer (if any) benefits and health 
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and safety training.  
Less tangible, but equally disconcerting, are the tensions being created 
by commercialisation between workers and township residents.  Micro-
enterprise, community-based refuse collection schemes are particularly 
problematic in this respect in terms of how they can play on the despera-
tion of unemployed residents eager to earn an income – even if it is 
only short term, dangerous and poorly paid work.   In the Billy Hattingh 
scheme in Khayelitsha, workers were deliberately portrayed as “lazy” and 
“overpaid” by municipal managers and community leaders (most notably 
Sanco officials) in order to generate support for the outsourcing programme. 
Workers have since had aggressive encounters with residents wanting 
to blame them for the poor services in the township, undermining the 
potential for a more unified and politicised challenge to the continued 
poor quality of refuse collection services in the township.
David A. McDonald 
ENDNOTES
1 In this case the reference is to the “value of office supplies and support equipment 
in stock at the depot” on a per capita basis in the suburb of Durbanville (R1.03/pp) 
as opposed to Khayelitsha (R0.08/pp).  We also found significant differences in 
areas such as vehicle quantity and quality, capital and operating expenditures per 
capita, human resources per capita, and so on.  To cite another example, per 
capita operating expenditure reported for the “last fiscal year” in Khayelitsha was 
R57/person while in Durbanville it was R194/person.  The research was conducted 
in mid-2000.  A detailed report on the research will be published in 2001 by the 




SELLING PRIVATISATION TO THE POOR:
The Billy Hattingh “Community Based Refuse 
Removal Scheme” in Khayelitsha
by
Msokoli Qotole and Mthetho Xali
The system will offer a once in a lifetime opportunity for the develop-
ment of potential local businessmen.
Extract from City of Tygerberg brochure promoting the development of the Billy 
Hattingh refuse collection scheme
Khayelitsha is a sprawling urban township of approximately 400 000 people thirty kilometres southeast of the central business district of Cape Town.  Built in the 1980s by the apartheid regime as a segregated residential area for African workers and a 
growing number of migrants from rural areas, Khayelitsha quickly became 
a sight of dense informal housing, high rates of unemployment, and social 
unrest.  It was also massively under-serviced in terms of the provision of 
water, electricity, refuse collection and other basic municipal amenities.
Seven years after the end of apartheid Khayelitsha is still under-serviced, 
with tens of thousands of people living without adequate access to potable 
water, electricity and sewerage systems.  Efforts have been made since 
1994 to upgrade and extend services to the area by the various municipal 
councils that have managed Khayelitsha, but these efforts have proven to 
be slow and the standard of services is generally well below that enjoyed 
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by the historically white areas of the city.
Refuse collection is one such service.  While most suburban areas, and 
many other township areas, receive once-a-week curbside collection of their 
refuse, most residents of Khayelitsha must take their garbage to a large 
communal skip that may be several hundred meters away from their home, 
and which may not be collected very frequently, resulting in overflows of 
refuse that attracts dogs and rats and becomes a health and safety hazard.  
In 1997, the Tygerberg City Council – an interim local authority respon-
sible for services in Khayelitsha as well as several historically white suburbs 
– decided to outsource refuse collection to a private company in a section 
of Khayelitsha north of Spine Road (comprising about 45 000 households). 
The contract went to a group called Billy Hattingh & Associates, a consor-
tium of private consultants and banks that had been developing small, 
medium and micro-enterprise (SMMEs) ventures related to service delivery 
throughout the country since the early 1990s.  
This report is an assessment of the Billy Hattingh initiative in Khayelitsha 
(still in operation at the time of writing) – colloquially referred to as “the one 
man contract” due to its very micro scale of entrepreneurial development.  The 
report begins with an overview of how the scheme operates and then moves 
on to discuss both the process that led to its formation as well as its outcomes 
since 1997.  The conclusions are generally critical, both in terms of the non-
consultative and biased manner in which the privatisation debate took place as 
well as the impact it has had on workers and the dynamics of service delivery 
in the city as a whole.  We argue here that the Billy Hattingh scheme has not 
only failed to significantly improve the level and quality of services in the area, it 
has also worsened service disparities in the city and exacerbated social tensions 
in Khayelitsha by pitting council workers against community members in the 
debates over service improvements and access to jobs.
The research consists of interviews with representatives from the City 
of Tygerberg, The Entrepreneurial Development Corporation (Tedcor) (the 
company that bought the concept from Billy Hattingh & Associates and 
now operates it), several local entrepreneurs who were awarded contracts, 
council workers and representatives of the South African Municipal Work-
ers Union (Samwu), and community members.  The one group that we 
were not able to access were the workers employed by the private entre-
preneurs.  The paper also draws on municipal records, correspondence of 
key actors and several other relevant documents, one of the most useful 
being a record of an arbitration hearing between the municipality and the 
union over the right to outsource (CCMA [undated]).  
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THE BILLY HATTINGH SCHEME
The Billy Hattingh scheme is perhaps best described by the National Business Initiative (NBI) which, in collaboration with the national government’s Municipal Infrastructure Investment Unit (MIIU), has written a glowing report of the Billy Hattingh scheme, 
referring to it as “innovative” and “successful” (Anon. 2000, 2).  According 
to the NBI, the scheme operates in the following way: 
The scheme is based on a relationship initiated in the early 1990s 
between Billy Hattingh & Associates, a private company, Future Bank, 
and First National Bank.  The scheme aims at the empowerment of 
local residents as entrepreneurs, the social and economic development 
of communities, and the growth of the SMME sector.  The scheme 
operates in the following way: Billy Hattingh & Associates signs a 
tri-partite contract with a local authority and a local resident acting 
as an entrepreneur.  The entrepreneur is paid a monthly contract fee 
by the local authority in exchange for the service rendered, the local 
authority retaining overall responsibility for the service and the collec-
tion of service payments from residents.  The process of selecting the 
entrepreneurs is carried out by a steering committee composed of Billy 
Hattingh & Associates, the local authority and community leaders.  The 
entrepreneurs must be unemployed and must come from the same 
community that they are to serve.  To the extent that entrepreneurs 
employ others, local labour must be used.  Future Bank, First National 
Bank, and associated institutions have undertaken to provide financial 
support for all approved projects.  The financial support includes a 
Mercedes-Benz truck, a large (30 cubic meter) container, as well as 
other appliances and equipment required for the execution of the 
contract.  Required maintenance and repairs are done by the equip-
ment suppliers, after approval by Billy Hattingh & Associates.  With 
regard to capacity building, the scheme ensures that through training 
the entrepreneurs are fully equipped to manage a profitable concern 
of their own.  The training courses include: business management, 
transport management, personnel management, industrial relations, 
and project-specific courses such as waste management. 
The Billy Hattingh scheme is not the only such micro-enterprise initia-
tive in the country.  Nor is the idea unique to South Africa.  There 
are similar micro-enterprise examples around the world where private 
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companies have acted as financial and technical intermediaries for local 
entrepreneurs on a wide range of services.  
THE LEAD UP TO PRIVATISATION
In April of 1995, the (then) Acting City Engineer of Tygerberg munici-pality gave a report to a Service Committee meeting on the state of the cleansing department in Khayelitsha.1 The gist of the report appears to have been a refutation of “rumours” about the department’s failures to 
reform itself and points to the potential to rebuild the cleansing department 
from within using public resources.  Amongst other things, the report notes 
that the proposal from the Khayelitsha Negotiating Forum to privatise refuse 
removal would “cause untold dissatisfaction in the workplace”.  The report 
also refutes claims that a compactor operation in Khayelitsha was not 
feasible – some managers felt that the narrow streets and shacks made it 
impossible to use large vehicles to collect refuse – and points out that 
four compactor trucks were already in use in the area.  The report recom-
mended the following with regards to the future of the department:
The current service rendering by the cleansing section be improved 
through:
• The implementation of the recently approved staff establishment for 
 the cleansing department;
• The implementation of the one man contracts in the squatter areas;
• The provision of the necessary compactors by the SMP or other 
 funding source;
• The concept of contractors with own vehicles and employing their 
 own employees not be recommended for refuse removal in 
 Khayelitsha.
These recommendations on the reorganisation of the cleansing service 
were shelved until a visit to Johannesburg to study a Billy Hattingh form of 
service delivery had been undertaken, as per a previous council decision 
(the latter being made at the request of a councillor from Khayelitsha 
according to council minutes).  This trip took place in May of 1995, and 
when the delegation returned they recommended the adoption of the Billy 
Hattingh scheme.2   
Towards the end of 1995, however, council was still regarding the issue 
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of cleansing in Khayelitsha as a matter that could be solved internally, with 
Executive Committee minutes from September of that year focussing on 
the need to purchase new equipment: “The Cleansing Section is currently 
utilising 13 tractors and trailers, 4 compactors and 4 seven ton trucks.  
These vehicles have become very unreliable.  On average there are 2 to 
3 tractors that would not start on any given morning.…  The operation 
of the cleansing branch is seriously jeopardised by the lack of reliable 
and adequate vehicles.”3  The resolution at the end of this meeting was to 
purchase two compactors immediately, with another two to be purchased 
two months later.  Vacancies within the branch, and the need to fill these 
positions, were also noted.
But before the reorganisation of internal resources could be effected, 
there was a discernible shift on the part of management’s attitudes to the 
cleansing “problem”.  Line management’s main concern shifted from one 
of under-resourcing to one where workers were deemed to be unproduc-
tive; that is, the blame for poor refuse collection in Khayelitsha was now 
placed on labourers who were not working hard enough.  According to 
the Acting City Engineer at the time, the compactor trucks in Khayelitsha 
were only picking up seven tons of refuse per day compared to the norm 
of 14 to 17 tons per day (CCMA [undated], 10).  Management also stated 
that workers were not disciplined, were leaving work before their official 
quitting time, and that the refuse removal system used in Khayelitsha was 
inefficient compared to the private sector, arguing that it cost the council 
R21 per erf to collect refuse in Khayelitsha as compared to R6-8 per erf in 
the market place for a comparable service (City of Tygerberg [undated]).
The Role of Sanco
It is at this point that the Khayelitsha branch of the South African National 
Civic Association (Sanco) weighed in on the debate, organising a workshop 
for residents on refuse collection issues in early 1996.  Notably, the 
workshop was organised and facilitated by Triple Trust Consulting, the same 
firm that was commissioned by the Tygerberg council to advise them on 
restructuring the cleansing department.  Triple Trust had also sent one of its 
consultants on the Tygerberg delegation that visited Johannesburg in May 
1995 to investigate the Billy Hattingh scheme there.  There were also two 
councillors from Khayelitsha at the workshop – the same two councillors 
that had advocated for the privatisation of cleansing operations in the 
area the year before – and several entrepreneurs from the community.  
In other words, it was a highly biased ‘community meeting’, prompting 
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a representative from the Commission for Conciliation Mediation and 
Arbitration (CCMA) to write in his report on the subsequent arbitration 
process that those in attendance at the community meeting, and those 
organising the meeting, had already made up their minds as to which way 
the restructuring of the cleansing department should go (i.e., privatisation) 
(CCMA [undated]). 
The mood of the community workshop was captured in the “Main 
Points” of the meeting report, as follows (Triple Trust Consulting 1996, 1):
Sanco stakeholders:
• Expressed great dissatisfaction with the overall waste management 
 system;
• Expressed hostility towards council, particularly the workers;
• Expressed enthusiasm for lower-tech/community-based, rather than 
 higher-tech/council-based capacity-building options.
It is also worth noting the manner in which the workshop was struc-
tured, to get a sense of the scope of debate and the direction it took (Triple 
Trust Consulting 1996, 1): 
• Identification/brainstorming of problems by Sanco-KDF [Khayelitsha 
 Development Forum] members;
• Clarification and fleshing out of these and related problems by Yonn 
 Dierwechter [a consultant from Triple Trust Consulting];
• Presentation by Yonn Dierwechter of three options for capacity-
 building under current consideration;
• Discussion and resolutions.
The outcome of the workshop was a strong endorsement of the Billy 
Hattingh scheme, with the Sanco office making a point of informing com-
munity members of their decisions and the reasons for these decisions 
(most notably their position that “inefficient council workers” were largely 
responsible for the inability of council to provide adequate cleansing 
services in Khayelitsha).
The Selection of Billy Hattingh
A proposal for outsourcing cleansing operations north of Spine Road 
was thereafter submitted by Tygerberg council and accepted by the Execu-
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tive Committee, after which a request for tenders was released.  Three 
companies responded to the request but two were immediately rejected on 
the grounds of higher costs and insufficient experience.  
The Billy Hattingh scheme was then selected, for the following reasons:4
• The scheme is cheaper than what it cost the council to clean 
 Khayelitsha.  Prior to the introduction of the scheme the council was 
 spending about R11m per year.  The Billy Hattingh scheme would 
 cost the council R4 774 674 per year.
• The scheme would ensure a regular service and a clean Khayelitsha. 
 The problem of ill discipline on the part of the council workers 
 would be solved as a result of the scheme.
• The scheme would cover areas of informal housing in Khayelitsha 
 that were currently inaccessible by compactor trucks due to a lack 
 of adequate road space by providing house-to-house collection for 
 these areas.
Selling the Scheme
Once a decision had been made, council embarked on a campaign to 
win the ‘hearts and minds’ of council workers and Khayelitsha residents as 
to the benefits of the Billy Hattingh scheme.  When speaking to workers 
the council argued that that no union jobs would be lost as a result 
of the outsourcing.  The workers affected by the scheme were told that 
they would be redeployed within the City of Tygerberg.  In a letter from 
council to Samwu, workers were assured that “alternative or vacant posi-
tions would be offered to the existing affected personnel to secure their 
future employment within the City of Tygerberg.  All its workers are 
very important to Council and existing service conditions and perks will 
remain.”5  Council argued that the position of some municipal workers 
might even improve as a result of redeployment. 
Workers were also told that the scheme was not equal to privatisation.  
The scheme was presented as a “partnership” between council, the entre-
preneurs and Billy Hattingh and workers were told that it should be 
viewed as a measure to extend and improve services to the community.  
Reference was also made to informal settlements that were going to receive 
refuse removal services for the first time through the implementation of 
the scheme.
In short, the Billy Hattingh scheme was presented to workers as a 
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demand by the community and the political leaders of Khayelitsha for 
better refuse collection services.  In a leaflet entitled “Become Part … there 
is a place for you”, council states that it has “committed itself to sustainable 
good quality service at the lowest affordable tariff to ensure a healthy 
working and living environment for all its people.  Khayelitsha’s existing 
cleansing service was identified as one of the areas where improvements 
should be considered to enhance the living conditions of residents and at 
the same time empower the local people”.
To the residents of Khayelitsha, the scheme was sold as a job creation 
measure.  The community was told that the scheme would bring relief 
to the unemployed, with an estimated 165 people being employed as 
labourers and 13 new entrepreneurs being created.  It was also argued that 
money generated from the scheme would remain in the area (implying, in 
turn, that council-run services represented an outward flow of resources 
from the community).   
There was also a television programme that highlighted the Billy Hat-
tingh scheme which showed the micro-enterprise workers to be highly sat-
isfied with their jobs.  One female worker interviewed for the programme 
expressed her happiness to have “the opportunity to be able to put bread 
on the table” as a result of her job with Billy Hattingh.
Resistance from Labour
The municipal workers union (Samwu) challenged the claims of the 
Tygerberg council on several fronts.  In a “Memorandum Against Priva-
tization” dated September 18, 1997, the union argued that private 
companies are “profit driven and not needs driven”.  They pointed 
to international experience with privatisation, arguing that it results in 
“the quality of services being cut back to increase profit of the private 
company; communities no longer being able to demand accountability 
from their local government representatives for services provided; job 
losses and work intensification; worsening working conditions; and 
lowered environmental, health and safety standards”. 
The union also objected to the introduction of the Billy Hattingh 
scheme on the basis that it constituted a unilateral change of conditions 
of employment for workers, and that suitable public sector alternatives 
had not been explored.  Repeated requests from Samwu to redeploy 
existing workers from wealthier suburbs (where many were under-
utilised) to Khayelitsha (where extra personnel could have made a 
significant difference) were met with silence from managers according 
15
Selling Privatisation to the Poor 
to union leaders.  Workers also organised a once-off clean-up of sec-
tions of Khayelitsha on their own time in an effort to demonstrate to 
residents in the township and to council that it was possible to keep 
the area clean using council workers, but these initiatives were not 
developed further by council. 
Tensions ran high when the Billy Hattingh scheme was eventually 
finalised.  Several councillors were physically assaulted in actions that 
took place during the union’s protests, and some union members were 
arrested.  The matter was subsequently taken to the Commission for 
Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration by the union, and both parties 
had to provide evidence in support of their positions.  One of the 
witnesses at the arbitration was an ANC councillor who was deeply 
involved in the outsourcing process.  Part of his evidence alluded to 
his attempts to get the council workers in the cleansing section to 
understand why ANC councillors supported the scheme.  He claimed 
that as an organisation they were concerned with living conditions in 
the area, chief amongst these being high levels of unemployment.6  In 
this councillor’s assessment of the situation, Samwu was a stumbling 
block to development in the area.
The CCMA ultimately ruled in favour of Samwu, arguing that the 
outsourcing of the cleansing function was an unfair labour practice.  
The Tygerberg council immediately appealed the decision, however, 
and received support from the (then) Minister of Constitutional Devel-
opment, Valli Moosa, who was responsible for local government affairs. 
The Minister wrote to the General Secretary of Samwu arguing that, 
“I believe the CCMA ruling in the Tygerberg case undermines the 
constitutional rights of the Tygerberg municipality.  I therefore support 
the action by the Tygerberg municipality in appealing against the CCMA 
ruling, and I intend to lodge a supporting affidavit with this appeal.”7  
The CCMA decision was ultimately overturned by the Labour Court and 
the outsourcing was able to proceed.    
EVALUATION OF THE SCHEME
Has the Billy Hattingh scheme been a success as an operation?  The City of Tygerberg has certainly been impressed, arguing that the new contractors now “collect 67 tons of refuse per day and provide door to door and street sweeping services to 
45 000 households.  Illegal dumping has been drastically reduced and the 
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appearance of the area has been improved” (City of Tygerberg [undated]).  
According to the same report, entrepreneurs have been provided with skills 
and resources and 119 new jobs have been created as a result of the 
scheme.
The Tygerberg council also claimed that the success of the scheme 
inspired municipal workers providing cleansing services south of Spine 
Road to work harder: “They now collect 42 tons per day”.  As noted earlier, 
council had previously reported that municipal workers in a similar area 
were only collecting seven tons of refuse per day.
The National Business Initiative’s (NBI) assessment is also very positive: 
“The main roads are now cleaned daily instead of once in six months; 
much of the illegal dumping in other areas has been stopped; [and] 
the standard of living of the entrepreneurs has improved (along with the 
standard of living of those employed by the entrepreneurs)” (Anon. 2000, 
4).  
The entrepreneurs that we spoke to were also positive about the 
scheme. They said that they now know how to run a business and have cre-
ated jobs for the unemployed in the area.  One entrepreneur complained 
about the council not cleaning the building rubble in the open spaces that 
then makes these open spaces dumping areas for residents, and several 
others noted that there was still room for improvement – particularly 
with respect to litter – but overall these entrepreneurs were happy with 
their situation and the quality of the job they were doing.  The Tedcor 
community liaison officer (the group that now runs the scheme) also felt 
that the scheme has been a success; so much so that they have expanded 
their operations to Crossroads and Phillipi in Cape Town.  
However, the council operations manager in Khayelitsha was not as 
upbeat about the scheme.  In an interview with the author, he noted that 
it had created jobs and entrepreneurs but also identified several negatives 
with the Billy Hattingh operation:8 
• The entrepreneurs did not have adequate background in waste 
 management and sometimes the service they provide is not up to the 
 expected standard (council has since appointed an inspector to 
 ensure that the entrepreneurs deliver what is expected of them); 
• Illegal dumping continues to be a problem and there is still a 
 considerable amount of litter around;
• The scheme is not suitable for all refuse removal functions; for 
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 example, the scheme is not equipped to collect builder’s rubble;
• House-to-house collection in the informal settlement areas is not 
 taking place as planned. 
(This latter point was confirmed by the entrepreneurs we interviewed 
who told us that they no longer provided house-to-house collection in the 
informal areas.  The reason they gave for this is that residents were putting 
their clothes in black refuse bags and workers would sometimes take these 
bags by mistake thinking that it was rubbish.) 
This manager also had a different perspective on why it is that waste 
collection rates had been apparently low with council workers and had 
improved under the Billy Hattingh scheme.  Rather than blaming it on inef-
ficient municipal workers – as the Tygerberg council had done – he claims 
that the poor collection rates were a result of weak municipal manage-
ment: “Management is also to be blamed for the situation of cleansing 
in Khayelitsha.  If you don’t manage there will be problems”.  According 
to him, “The cleansing department can be managed cost-effectively if man-
aged effectively”.9  In other words, what existed before was “mismanage-
ment” and not “inefficient workers”.  
The council workers that we spoke to operating south of Spine 
Road (i.e., those still working for the council) were also critical of the 
scheme.  They alleged that the scheme encourages exploitation of labour-
ers.  According to one council labourer: “Billy Hattingh workers are 
responsible for cleaning, sweeping, and litter picking.  Even those workers 
that are responsible for refuse collection, they are also expected to do 
litter picking.  The wages they get are far lower than the minimum in the 
municipal sector”.  Wages for the council workers were, in fact, consider-
ably higher than those working for Billy Hattingh at the time of interviews 
– approximately R1 600 per month versus R1 300 per month – as were 
other employment benefits. 
Council workers also told us they have not seen any significant 
improvements in refuse services in the area as a result of the scheme: 
“Illegal dumping continues to exist, there is no house-to-house collection 
in the informal settlement as it was promised and there is no regular street 
sweeping.”
The Samwu metro branch secretary agreed with the views of council 
workers, arguing that the scheme did not have an impact on unem-
ployment levels.10  He argued that general working conditions for those 
employed in the Billy Hattingh scheme were lower than those of council 
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workers, and as a result some of the workers employed by Billy Hattingh 
have been approaching the union to become members.  
According to Samwu’s website (www.cosatu.org.za/samwu/cid.htm) the 
privatisation scheme is “wasting council’s funds”: “The Metro Council has 
wasted millions of rands on a private refuse removal in Khayelitsha, which 
has failed so dismally that municipal workers have had to return to the 
area to assist the private company.  In effect the Council is ‘supplementing’ 
the services that have failed to be provided by the company, and not the 
other way round”.
Our own assessment of the scheme is quite critical as well.  In addition 
to the multi-tasking that some interviewees suggest forces workers to miss 
their lunch and tea breaks in order to finish their jobs on time, and the 
lower wages and benefits of Billy Hattingh workers, there is the larger 
question of service equality in the city of Cape Town as a whole.  With the 
introduction of low-tech, high-labour methods of refuse collection under 
Billy Hattingh, the city council may have created some additional jobs and 
entrepreneurial skills, but they have effectively precluded any opportunity 
to provide mechanised services of the sort and on the scale provided 
in historically white neighbourhoods, thereby entrenching many of the 
apartheid-era service inequalities of the city.  
The Billy Hattingh scheme has also stripped the municipality of the 
institutional memory that was in place with workers (and to some extent 
managers) in terms of the cleansing needs and challenges of Khayelitsha.  
The Billy Hattingh scheme has contracted these tasks out on a short-term 
basis to entrepreneurs and workers with little, if any, experience with waste 
management, and who may not be in business in a few years time – taking 
with them any knowledge they may have gained about effective, equitable 
and efficient waste management in the township.  
Finally, the Billy Hattingh scheme has driven a wedge between munici-
pal workers and residents of Khayelitsha.  By starting from a position 
that was antagonistic to council workers, rather than trying to find ways 
of exploring how to rebuild and experiment with the public sector, the 
Tygerberg council has put in motion a social dynamic between Samwu 
workers and township residents in Khayelitsha that may take years to 
normalise.
The biased and undemocratic manner in which the scheme was intro-
duced to the area is also cause for concern given that this kind of 
micro-enterprise outsourcing is being actively promoted in municipalities 
throughout the country by governmental and non-governmental organiza-
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tions.  In the push to address the abysmal refuse conditions of townships 
and informal settlements in South Africa it is important to fully assess the 
pros and cons of SMMEs and to have more representative consultations 
with community groups, labour organizations, local government represen-
tatives and other interested parties.  The stakes are too high to rush into 
ad hoc, low-cost options for what are in reality long-term social, economic 
and environmental problems with waste management in South Africa.
ENDNOTES
1 See minutes of the Continuation Meeting held on April 10, 1995.
2 In his evidence, the Assistant Superintendent of cleansing indicated that the 
delegation had visited an area near Alexandra known as Sethla.
3 See Executive Committee Meeting minutes, Tygerberg council, September 13, 
1995.
4 See minutes of the meeting held in Bellville on January 17, 1997.  See also CCMA 
[undated], especially the evidence given by councillor Ngcuka (pp. 28-30).
5 See letter from Tygerberg Council to Samwu dated July 3, 1997.
6 See the transcript of the CCMA arbitration hearing, where councillor V. Ngcuka 
gave evidence about addressing workers in the cleansing branch in Khayelitsha.
7 Letter addressed to Samwu’s General Secretary from Valli Moosa, dated 
April 3, 1998.
8 Interview with the City of Tygerberg Operations Manager for Khayelitsha, Septem-
ber 17, 2000.
9 Interview with City of Tygerberg Operations Manager for Khayelitsha, September 
17, 2000.  





FISCAL DISCIPLINE AND WORKER 
RESPONSE:




He looked at that soaking garbage and knew for the first time what 
his job was all about.  Not engineering or transportation or source 
reduction.  He dealt in human behaviour, people’s habits and impulses, 
their uncontrollable needs and innocent wishes, maybe their passions, 
certainly their excesses and indulgences.
Don De Lillo, Underworld
The iGoli 2002 programme of restructuring the Greater Johannes-burg Metropolitan Council (GJMC) has important implications for access to municipal services and infrastructure in South Africa’s largest city.  This report examines the impact of the iGoli plan 
on solid waste management, with a particular focus on the allocation of 
resources between areas of the city and conditions of workers.
Waste management in this report refers mainly to the collection and 
transportation of domestic refuse.  Issues of waste disposal as well as 
industrial, business, medical and hazardous waste will not be addressed in 
depth.  It should also be noted that service restructuring in Johannesburg 
is still rather fluid, to the extent that some of the findings and analysis 
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provided here may shortly become outdated.  However, the primary focus 
of this report is to provide an overview of restructuring and to situate this in 
its historical and socio-economic context, in the hope of contributing to a 
better understanding of the longer-term implications of these reforms.
Qualitative, in-depth interviews have been conducted with municipal 
officials, managers at individual depots, and 60 workers at the solid waste 
depots of Inner City, Norwood, Selby, Waterval and Avalon, in four of the 
local councils of the GJMC.  These interview areas cover neighbourhoods 
with different levels and quality of service, from previously white suburbs 
to the central business district (CBD) and black townships (especially 
Soweto and environs).  Interview materials highlight employees’ experi-
ence of and response to current changes in service delivery systems. 
THE CORPORATISATION OF WASTE 
SERVICES
The slogan under which the iGoli 2002 restructuring plan for Johannesburg has been marketed – “It Cannot Be Business As Usual” – encapsulates the double agenda of improving the finan-cial sustainability of the municipality while at the same time 
reducing inequalities in service delivery.  On the first point, massive budget 
deficits and general administrative inefficiencies have been represented 
as legacies from the past, reflected by Johannesburg’s declining credit 
rating and deteriorating financial position.  On the second point, the 
restructuring project has been depicted as the final step in a process 
of local government transformation that accompanies the post-apartheid 
transition: an integrated framework for service delivery to bridge the social 
gaps administered by the old separate structures for historically white and 
black areas of the city.  
In the iGoli plan’s broad outline this restructuring is intended to take 
the form of either privatisation or corporatisation of municipal amenities 
and infrastructures, with the latter referring to the transfer of assets and 
services to new “utilities” and “agencies” where the council remains the 
sole shareholder.  These corporatised entities, registered in terms of the 
Companies Act, are expected to operate as autonomous cost centres and 
structures for the management of service delivery contracts.  In particular, 
assets formerly run by the GJMC Solid Waste Directorate are scheduled to 
become the ownership of a new utility, Pikitup Johannesburg (Pty.) Ltd.,  
which started operations in June 2001.  The GJMC retains a 100% share 
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ownership of the utility (GJMC 1999a).  
These changes in the sphere of public service delivery in Johannesburg 
are indicative of what is referred to in the international literature as the 
rise of the “contracting state” (Broadbent and Laughlin 1996; Harden 
1992; Eardley 1997).  This constitutes a notable departure from the initial 
orientation of the South African government and the African National 
Congress (ANC) towards a “developmental” state that contained a strong 
interventionist and redistributive component.  
The concept of a “contracting state” refers to a separation of the local 
functions of service authority and those of service provision, with the 
latter being delegated to entities operating on private business principles to 
establish, operate and develop infrastructures.  The organisational units of 
public service delivery and their products are ring-fenced and reconstituted 
as autonomous profit centres, which increases the scope for managerial 
decision-making and decreases the possibility of cross-subsidisation from 
other levels or structures of government (Bond, Dor and Ruiters 1999).  
The choice of utilities departs from a pure public-private partnership 
(PPP) approach, since no concession or leasing agreement is entered with 
private capital to run the service.  Moreover, the council retains substantial 
regulatory powers in setting standards and tariffs and in approving the 
utility’s capital expenditures and borrowing requirements (GJMC 1999b).  
However, this model confirms the essential feature of PPP schemes in 
the separation between the regulatory authority of the service and its 
provider/operator.  The utility’s independence from the council and from 
political scrutiny is reinforced by the need to maintain stable credit ratings, 
ensure a prompt recovery of costs, and repress rate defaulters and insurgent 
practices (Govender and Aiello 1999).  
The choice of a formally “public sector” option in this case can, 
however, reinforce the privatising nature of the mechanism.  In fact, the 
position of the council as the sole shareholder would make it particularly 
susceptible to recurring undesirable prospects of covering losses and risks 
of the utility (Cointreau-Levine 1994), which iGoli 2002 wants to avoid.  
Consequently, utilities’ corporate priorities, cost-recovery needs and profit-
making imperatives have a potentially much stronger and more immediate 
leverage on the council’s agenda on standards and tariffs than in the 
case of a concession with a separate private company.  In the case of a 
private contract, items such as revenues and risk sharing are negotiated and 
contractually set in a more predictable way and for a longer time frame, 
while renegotiations of these aspects between utilities and the council take 
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place at every budget year with the potential of introducing extremely 
short-term and ad hoc corporate objectives.  At the same time this confirms 
that asset ownership is not necessarily the decisive factor in defining the 
privatising nature of restructuring.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT TRANSITION AND 
IGOLI 2002
Under apartheid, white municipalities were largely funded through 
revenue raised in locally-based business and industrial activities, while 
black townships, in the absence of any significant economic activity, relied 
on service fees and municipal housing rents, with limited transfers from 
the national government.  No cross-subsidisation existed between the 
two urban realities.  The Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan 
Council (GJTMC), established in 1993 as an interim structure in the transi-
tion to the 1995 municipal elections, prioritised the establishment of a 
unified administration and tax base for a highly diversified metropolitan 
area whose centres were provided by the former Johannesburg and Soweto 
city councils and nine other racially segregated municipalities.  At the same 
time, the manufacturing decline of the city, coupled with a rise in informal 
activities and increasing inflows of new residents led to a proliferation 
of shack settlements that implied for waste management a rising demand 
concentrated in sites difficult to service.  The urgency of the problem 
was highlighted by the fact that by 1992 about two million people in 
Johannesburg (half of the population of the city) were without water or 
sanitation services (Swilling and Hutt 1999, 189).  
While bulk capital investment in waste management remained the com-
petence of the GJTMC, the transitional arrangements provided for a second 
tier of local government, constituted by four metropolitan substructures 
that could exercise GJTMC-related functions on the basis of their ability 
to develop strategic management frameworks.  However, the vagueness in 
this arrangement led to a stalemate in the division of tasks between the two 
levels, which paralysed any attempt to modify the allocation of resources 
between them.  As a result, the Johannesburg City Council (servicing 
historically white neighbourhoods) had a staff-to-serviced population ratio 
of 1:482, a budget of R123.41/person per annuum, waste collection once 
a week, with bins and plastics provided, and regular street cleaning, while 
the staff-to-residents ratio in the Soweto City Council was 1:2 412, with 
a budget of R26.31/person per annum, refuse collection every two weeks 
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and no service for street corner dumps.  Shack settlements, then adminis-
tered by the Transvaal provincial government, had a staff-to-resident ratio 
of 1:28 333 and a budget of R0.74/person per annum (Swilling and Hutt 
1999, 194-7).
The Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council (GJMC), with its four 
Metropolitan Local Councils (MLCs), replaced the GJTMC after the 1995 
local elections and inherited this situation of deep fragmentation and 
inequality.  However, the new political legitimacy gained by the council 
did not facilitate a clearer articulation of tasks between the metropolitan 
administration and the local councils, and the unification of waste manage-
ment services remained unfinished.  The GJMC responded with a manage-
rialist turn by starting an “Organisational Review”, completed during the 
second half of 1997, which recommended a streamlining of managerial 
functions with a “performance-orientated” outlook and a subdivision of 
the municipality’s “core” and “non-core” activities.  While waste manage-
ment fell under the former, this exercise opened the way to the eventual 
privatisation of municipal assets such as Metro Gas, airports and the fresh 
produce market, in what was to become the iGoli 2002 plan. 
Crucial stakeholders like the South African Municipal Workers Union 
(Samwu) were notified of the government’s organisational review only at an 
advanced stage.  Local union organisers, caught completely unprepared, 
were not requested to provide any input.1  The new philosophy of the 
council, which departed from a previous emphasis on participatory, decen-
tralised management, was embodied in the appointment of a “Committee 
of 10”, made up of municipal councillors, following a proclamation by the 
provincial government.  This requested the GJMC to address the gap in 
budget finances through credit control policies, a more efficient utilisation 
of the staff and a study of “alternative forms” of service delivery that 
retained “income generating” functions in the municipality, and identified 
other activities to be outsourced.  In this context, the municipality’s role 
was limited to “core” functions of defining development objectives and 
policies and to the “provision, regulation and monitoring” of service deliv-
ery and income generation, where the involvement of the private sector 
was encouraged.  These activities were scheduled to be ring-fenced in 
order to calculate market costs, benefits and potentials.  A broader consul-
tative process including business, labour and civil society was supposed to 
define forms of commercialisation or privatisation for these entities (GJMC 
1998).
The Committee of 10 was then replaced by a “Committee of 15” 
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(Govender and Aiello 1999, 652-3), with an even greater prominence for 
unelected officials and a clear mandate to identify municipal activities 
targeted for privatisation and public-private partnerships, or Municipal 
Services Partnerships (MSP), as they are referred to in South Africa.  The 
integration of municipal services delivery and the redefinition of forms of 
provision and access came to depend increasingly on the ability of the 
council to recover costs, especially by disciplining rate defaulters through 
the suspension of services.  The viability of public services relied increas-
ingly on income generated by autonomous business units.  
The centralisation of power in the hands of municipal technocrats, 
and the removal of the last semblance of linkages between the restructur-
ing process and participative-representative forms of policy-making were 
eventually completed at the beginning of 1999.  The privatisation of Metro 
Gas, the fresh produce markets and other projects were then well under 
way.  A new City Manager, Ketso Gordhan, and three officers in the areas 
of transformation, finance and labour relations were also appointed.  This 
group of officials, together with council representatives in the “Transforma-
tion Lekgotla”, ultimately completed the iGoli 2002 plan (Govender and 
Aiello 1999, 655). 
At the same time, the notion of a “Unicity”, provided for in Johan-
nesburg by the 1999 Municipal Structures Act, reduced the possibility of 
decentralised metropolitan policy-making, which had inspired initial views 
of a “community-driven” process of transformation.  This is now replaced 
by a centralised policy-making authority with a decisive role for a new 
executive mayor, and an articulation of the city’s territory into 11 “regions” 
(replacing the MLCs) in charge of defining local economic development 
plans.  The unicity concept reduces the decentralisation of political partici-
pation to a decentralisation of functions, redefined as corporate units and 
profit centres in the context of a hierarchical, managerial and de-politicised 
pattern of decision-making (Hassen 1999). 
This shift in the municipality’s internal functions and the subordination 
of sub-metropolitan policy-making to attracting private investment and 
business confidence was pressingly supported by the World Bank.  This 
institution, in fact, provided funding to develop a Local Economic Devel-
opment (LED) methodology to monitor market and investment opportuni-
ties, with a specific focus on small-medium enterprises, through new 
economic information systems.  The Bank recognised that iGoli 2002 must 
be successful if similar processes were to be introduced in other South 
African municipalities (Chandra and Ahmad 2000). 
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Levels of Service Inequality
On the eve of the inauguration of the proposed utility (approved by the 
Executive Committee of the GJMC on March 16, 1999), the waste manage-
ment service in Johannesburg is organised according to a division of tasks 
between the central Metropolitan level and the four Municipal Local Coun-
cils (with the latter set to dissolve into the amalgamated unicity): Eastern 
(EMLC), Northern (NMLC), Southern (SMLC) and Western (WMLC).  The 
MLCs actually play what is by far the most decisive role in the service, with 
the GJMC being allocated approximately 9% of the 1999-2000 budget.  Of 
all the MLCs the biggest share of the budget (approximately 33%) goes to 
the SMLC, which covers recently developed, and rapidly populating, poor 
areas such as Orange Farm (started in 1988 and incorporated in the SMLC 
in 1997) and new extensions of Ennerdale and Lenasia.  It is, in particular, 
the prerogative of the GJMC to run the waste disposal in landfill sites and 
incineration, while the MLCs are responsible for collection (including street 
cleaning) and transport.  Only 6.6% of the waste produced in the GJMC 
area is incinerated, and the remaining is treated in landfill sites. 
The service of collection is currently structured in 13 depots and 54 
“garden sites”.  Garden sites are fenced dumping areas, attended by a 
municipal supervisor and an assistant, which are used as collection points 
for domestic waste, garden refuse and tree cutting.  These are also the 
points where waste for recycling is dumped and collected by recycling 
companies (GJMC 1999a, 12).  Currently, all garden sites in Johannesburg, 
which serve 50% of the municipality’s area and collect 15% of its waste, 
are located in historically white or business areas of town.  Waste is 
disposed in six landfill sites and one 350 kg/hr gas-fired incinerator (limited 
to processing animal carcasses, condemned foodstuffs, and medical waste). 
Of the six landfill sites, two are facing closure in 2001 (Kya Sands, to 
be replaced by Northern Works, and Robinson Deep), while the longest 
lifespan is for the Goudkoppies site, scheduled for closure in 2030 (GJMC 
1999a, 9; Business Day, February 1, 2001). 
Collection of domestic refuse is done by approximately 200 municipal 
rear-end loader trucks or by contractors’ compactor trucks, working with 
240-litre wheeled bins or 85-litre bins.  Bulk collection is generally done in 
5.5, 6, 8 or 9 cubic metre skip containers serviced by lift-on trucks. The 73 
informal settlements in the city, with approximately 130 000 households 
and 553 000 inhabitants, are serviced by 5.5 cubic metre open skip 
containers placed at street corners.  Street cleaning is done regularly on 
approximately 1 000 kms of municipal streets (mainly business, shopping 
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and public parking areas) and litter-picking on approximately 3 000 kms, 
of the 7 700 kms of streets in the municipal area.  Street cleaning collects 
approximately 11% of the waste produced in the municipality, while an 
additional 21% is constituted by illegal dumping (GJMC 1999a, 12-13).  
According to the GJMC, “very little” is done in the sphere of public 
participation, education and environmental awareness, due to budget cuts 
(GJMC 1999a, 14), and the municipality does not have any programme in 
place to support the differentiated collection of domestic waste (especially 
organic).  Table 1 provides a breakdown of waste facilities and waste 
production for the metropolitan area as of 2000.
Table 1: Solid Waste Facilities and Production of Waste in the 
11 Regions of the New Johannesburg Unicity, 2000
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Note: Suburban residential areas are written normally, informal settlements in italics, business/
commercial areas in bold, townships in capital letters and industrial areas in capital italics.
*= information provided by landfill sites, 1999.
**=Orange Farm is serviced by the Palm Springs Lekoa-Vaal Regional Services landfill site, outside 
the GJMC area.
SOURCE: Author’s elaboration from GJMC population statistics and GJMC 
1999-2001 Budgets.
The GJMC’s waste management budget has been drastically reduced 
during the past five years, and no funds for capital expenditures were 
made available between 1997 and 2000, while contractually committed 
items constituted the service’s capital budget.  This effectively prevented the 
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result, the 1997-98 capital budget of R1.5 million was only 0.4% of the 
total for the GJMC, with a 71% decline in absolute terms from the previous 
year.  The 1997-98 operating expenditures of R338.3 million led to a 
shortfall of R133.6 million, notwithstanding an increase in the operating 
income from R200 million to R280 million in 1999.  The shortfall was 
reduced to R110 million in 1999-2000, also thanks to a drastic reduction 
in repairs expenditures for an ageing and collapsing fleet (in 2000, 60% of 
all repairs done in GJMC workshops were related to the waste management 
fleet (GJMC 1999a, 16)). 
In 1999-2000 salaries constituted around 35% of all expenditures, 
whose main items were activities defined as “non-income generating” such 
as garden sites, street cleaning and illegal dumping.  To these are to be 
added R61 million in outstanding loans (corresponding to more than 40% 
of all fixed and movable assets).  The main reasons for the deficit were 
the decaying state of the service’s fleet, the trucks’ high downtime, and 
the frequent use of contracts on an ad hoc basis as a solution to these 
problems. 
At the same time, the neglect of council’s assets – which is in itself 
the product of budget cuts – has direct negative impacts on garden sites 
maintenance, street cleaning and collection of illegal dumping (which 
together already account for about one third of all the waste generated 
by the four local councils).  It can therefore be concluded that the main 
reason for the current deficit of the service is provided not by high wage 
costs, as some managers claim, but by poor fleet management and by the 
lack of capital investment consequent to budgetary downsizing.  In a way 
the deficit operates as a self-reproducing, “catch-22” situation: shortfalls 
require cuts and austerity, which increase the shortfalls.  In this situation, 
fiscal austerity can no longer be justified as a means to allocate resources 
more effectively and to reduce deficits but becomes itself the main factor in 
the reproduction of the deficit. 
Moreover, the argument from the council that “non-income generating” 
activities such as garden sites contribute to the deficit obscures the eco-
nomic and environmental relevance of garden sites as the only recycling 
area in Johannesburg’s waste system and a source of employment and trade 
opportunities.  For these reasons the expertise of municipal workers as 
managers of the garden sites, organisers of relations with the community, 
and brokers of a higher environmental awareness is very important.  Other 
items that impact on the current shortfall are street cleaning (which is 
currently concentrated in the most affluent suburbs) and the removal of 
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illegal dumping and litter.  The latter suffers from the lack of a regular 
service and the absence of small-size structures like garden sites in poorer 
areas such as Orange Farm, Ennerdale, Poortjie and Lenasia, and from the 
limited infrastructures for street traders in the CBD (GJMC 1999c).  At the 
same time illegal dumping, which affects almost exclusively the poorest 
areas of the city and some CBD areas, causes environmental and health 
hazards that are strictly related to the lack of a regular collection. 
New capital injections directly related to iGoli 2002 allowed GJMC’s 
overall capital expenditures to more than double in 2000-01 to R828.1 
million.  This was funded with proceedings from sales of assets (18.1%) 
and with grants from the Finance Department and the Development Bank 
of Southern Africa (34.2%), in support for the restructuring exercise (GJMC 
2000).  The allocation for waste management was also significantly raised, 
but it remained a relatively modest share of the total budget. 
At the same time, waste management retains a strong non-income gen-
erating profile, as a result of a non-marketable, non-tradable component of 
the service that in terms of waste by-laws has to be provided irrespective 
of payment.  In fact, the service in 2000-01 contributed only 3.55% 
to GJMC’s revenues, while its contribution to expenses was 5.1% (third 
biggest item), notwithstanding rates of increase in user fees (implemented 
across the board and with minimal cross-subsidisation) that for the past 
five years have been well above the rate of inflation.  As a result, waste 
management is one of the services most heavily cross-subsidised from 
other service branches of the GJMC at the moment, with about 40% of its 
budget being funded by other sectors.  
Despite the cross-subsidisation from other sectors, the impact of waste 
tariffs on households’ municipal services accounts is already relatively 
high.  This is especially true for low-income families (12.5% of all 
domestic rates for a 280 sq.m. stand,R7 000 land value and no electricity, 
compared to 6.1% for a 1205 sq.m. stand and R45 000 land value). 
Moreover, it also translates into a level of non-payment that in 1998 was 
R55 million, equivalent to 41.1% of the shortfall and 15% of the budget 
(GJMC 1999a, 15). 
These concerns are heightened by the fact that inherited inequalities in 
access to the service (see Table 2)2 have become sharper and deeper after 
five years of fiscal austerity.  As in the case of other municipal services, 
problems associated with the disposal of solid waste in Johannesburg 
continue to reflect the city’s socio-economic hierarchies.  In particular, an 
inverse relationship seems to exist between the density of consumption-
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accumulation of waste in privileged versus marginalised areas, and levels 
of access to refuse collection services.  Refuse in suburban, predominantly 
white, areas is the result of individualist, highly wasteful forms of consump-
tion across a dispersed area.  Ironically, it is in these areas that service 
provision is concentrated, and therefore this lifestyle is rewarded and 
encouraged, even if the cost of servicing it is a major factor behind the 
draining of municipal resources. 
On the contrary, marginalised, overcrowded communities with a higher 
collective and lower per capita production of waste are neglected.  In 
this way, the GJMC’s waste management system reflects a broader trend 
towards the fragmentation of urban space in South Africa.  Individual needs 
in high per capita consumption, wastage and income areas are prioritised 
to the detriment of community needs for improved environmental and 
hygienic conditions in under-serviced, over populated zones. 
In fact, while the affluent northern suburbs (which makes up approxi-
mately 25% of the municipality’s surface area and with a per capita daily 
waste production of 3.35 kgs) have fewer than 10% of households without 
waste collection services.  This figure increases to about 70%, with peaks of 
90-100%, in the Ennerdale-Orange Farm area in the South (less than 10% 
of the municipality’s area).  Moreover, these poor areas have much lower 
per capita waste production of 1.48 kgs.  Similar figures apply to Soweto, 
with a per capita average production of waste that is less than half that of 
the Sandton-Illovo-Rosebank-Melrose area, and yet an aggregate production 
three times bigger.  These figures indicate patterns of behaviour that in poor 
black townships and informal settlements are more orientated to the reuse 
and the extension of commodities such as plastics, cardboards and metal.
Disparities are accentuated by differences in technologies and materials 
for refuse collection.  Residents of the wealthier northern suburbs generally 
use 85- or 240-litre sealed and wheeled litter bins which are loaded 
onto compactor trucks and removed at once.  Conversely, nearly 600 
000 people living in informal settlements are generally serviced by 5.5 
cubic metre open skip containers located every 200 stands.  Given that 
containers are not closed and that loose waste is thrown into them (and 
can be emptied as rarely as once every three weeks) this constitutes a 
significant health and environmental hazard, amplified by insects and 
rodents attracted by unsealed waste.  Moreover, late collection leads 
residents to burn the refuse in containers to make space available, which 
generates potentially harmful fumes. 
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Table 2: Allocation of Resources for Waste Management in 
the Johannesburg Unicity, 2000
Source: Author’s elaboration from GJMC population statistics and 1999-2001 Budget.
The GJMC has recently withdrawn from initial attempts to provide more 
uniform access to bins for rich and poor areas, due to budget constraints.  
In April 2000 the SMLC decided to centralise container operations in an 
independent depot as a separate cost centre.3 
The use of containers represents an extension in the waste management 
system of apartheid-initiated “site and service” policies according to which 
poor communities are allocated inferior services that the new government 
first retained as an emergency measure, than as an “incremental” solution, 
and finally confirmed as a normal feature of urban life under fiscal austerity 
for people unable or “unwilling” to pay.4 In the same vein, pit-latrines have 
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taps have replaced in-house running water.  Budget cuts are not to be 
considered here as merely unfortunate necessities.  Rather, the segmenta-
tion of services according to the affluence of residents, far from being a 
simple legacy of the past that has to be addressed with scarce resources, 
becomes the essence and the programmatic representation of the iGoli 
2002 philosophy.  In the words of two officials operating within this 
restructuring framework:
Pit-latrines and community standpipes offer a much lower level of 
service [than in-house waterborne services and sanitation], but they 
may be the only services sustainable given the economic conditions of 
the customers being served.  In general, different levels for solid waste 
collection services could also be applied.  Lower services levels, includ-
ing communal skip or once a week collection could be used in lower 
income areas with a lower ability or willingness to pay.  Twice weekly 
curbside service with 240 litre containers is the top level of service in 
higher income communities  (Dohrman and Aiello 1999, 697). 
What emerges here is that the concept of scarcity, either due to coun-
cil’s budget cuts or enforced through national and provincial policy-mak-
ing, assumes the role of a disciplinary and pedagogical device to convey 
the message that equality of access to and equal standards is foreign to a 
managerial notion of “market sustainability”.  Ancillary to this conclusion 
is that residents and users must be educated to a hierarchical stratification 
of the services that they can claim, depending on criteria such as their 
monetary income, availability and “willingness” to pay. 
EMPLOYMENT CHANGES AND 
CONTRACTING-OUT
At the end of 2000 the GJMC solid waste departments employed approximately 3 000 staff, plus 1 500 casual workers, to cover a “theoretically” fully staffed level of 4 523 (GJMC 1999a, 8).  Budget cuts had enforced a freeze in new recruitments 
for the previous three years.  It is indicative, in fact, that even with the 
employment of casuals the service did not achieve its fully staffed level.  
Permanent employment has been reduced largely through natural attrition 
and by not replacing retiring workers.  Considering the municipality’s ter-
ritorial expansion over this period, the GJMC estimates an average vacancy 
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level of 22% of its workforce.  It can therefore be argued that the three-year 
recruitment freeze disguises a reduction in real terms of employment levels 
in the service.  With a hypothetical natural attrition of only 5% a year, 
650-700 permanent jobs would have been lost in the past five years. 
Importantly, more than half of casuals are employed in the demographi-
cally fastest growing council, the SMLC, which shows that the need for 
newly established services in recent expansions of the city has been 
addressed to the detriment of permanent job creation.  This use of casual, 
temporary (three-month contracts) and contract labour is not new to waste 
management services in Johannesburg and is in fact historically entrenched 
in this sector, more so than other municipal services.  In particular, casuals 
are hired to fill staff shortages and perform intermittent tasks, such as the 
removal of illegal dumps.  As such, they are largely concentrated in the 
poorer areas of the city, as in the SMLC, where in 1999-2000 the amount 
of money spent on casuals was 20% of that for total wages of permanent 
workers, and the WMLC, where this figure was 48% (GJMC 1999a).  At 
the same time, many capital-intensive tasks have been contracted for a 
long time to private operators, as in the case of refuse compactor trucks, 
outsourced in the middle of the 1980s.  
Moreover, the community-based and labour-intensive components of 
refuse services, which rely on users’ discipline in upholding timetables, 
avoiding littering and maintaining collection bins, has facilitated experi-
ments with decentralised “community contracting” in waste collection.  
These complex contractual arrangements – and especially those defined by 
Swilling and Hutt (1999, 206) as “citizen participation” in service manage-
ment and “economic participation” of contractors in service delivery – 
tend to overlap, especially when the involvement of entrepreneurs from 
the community is seen as a way to re-establish trust, which minimises 
non-payment and illegal dumping.  The ability of the municipality to use 
contracts not just as an economic device but as a politically legitimising 
strategy has marked the success or the failure of similar schemes.  At the 
same time, ruling parties can use these networks to boost their support in 
otherwise potentially problematic or disaffected areas by using the service 
as a means of patronage and clientelistic recruitment by local leaders and 
councillors.  Conversely, these initiatives have generally been regarded 
with suspicion by other established actors, such as a largely unionised 
workforce, which have seen them as forms of unfair competition and 
undercutting of employment conditions. 
Experiences with community contracting in Johannesburg include the 
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so-called “one man contract” schemes, privately funded, in informal sec-
tions of Alexandra.  Here, community leaders contracted residents to col-
lect and transport refuse to designated collection points, but the system 
encountered many difficulties and became un-economical, due in part to 
residents’ demands to be paid in exchange for their co-operation (Palmer 
Development Group 1996, 116-7). 
In the Johannesburg central business district and historically white 
suburbs, contracts are usually for the short-term provision, up to four 
years, of compactor trucks.  Contractors work with a team of council 
refuse workers responsible for loading the trucks.  The working week for 
contractors usually lasts 44 hours, on dayshifts and nightshifts.  In some 
cases the council enforces penalties for poor performance (usually linked 
to a specified quantity of waste to transport per day).  In 1999-2000 the 
GJMC spent R62 million in vehicles’ contracts (15.8% of the operating 
budget), plus R30 million in smaller, ad hoc contracts for collection, street 
cleaning and supply of bins, bringing the total outsourcing costs to 23.5% 
of the operating budget (GJMC 1999a, 17).  The council recognises that a 
substantial share of this cost is caused by ad hoc hiring of vehicles caused 
by the ageing of the council’s fleet, which cannot be attended to due to 
funding shortages.  In this way, measures presented as cost-cutting have a 
direct effect in increasing expenditures. 
Companies that have entered contractual relationships with the GJMC 
are usually South African-based corporations.  The main player, especially 
through its subsidiary Wade Refuse, is Enviroserv Holdings Ltd., a listed 
company whose main shareholders are Ferbros, Old Mutual, Standard Bank 
and Bidvest, with a limited participation by Zader (a black empowerment 
group).  Enviroserv has emerged with a dominant market position after 
its merger with Waste-Tech.  Other companies that have benefited from 
GJMC’s contracts are Waste Group, Multi Waste and Nare Refuse Removals. 
Processes of concentration in the sector have substantially reinforced the 
position of companies such as Enviroserv, which brings into question the 
future viability of small and medium “community empowerment” schemes.  
Moreover, it is clear that this increasing corporate power will use opportuni-
ties provided by iGoli 2002 to expand to the broader waste management 
system.  As a company report from Enviroserv (1999) states:
The intention of the Gauteng local authority to run its Johannesburg 
Waste Management Utility as a Public Private Partnership will hopefully 
influence the stagnation seen nationally in the privatisation of municipal 
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services.  We remain positive that the new Minister of Local Govern-
ment will accelerate this process and our domestic waste division, 
Wade Refuse, is well positioned to benefit from these opportunities. 
The power that corporate capital is gaining is likely to further encourage 
many of the current undesirable consequences of subcontracting.  This 
refers in particular to the high levels of capital intensity associated with the 
use of compactors.  This can lead to economic inefficiencies, especially 
considering that organic waste does not require compacting, or requires it 
at far lower levels than inorganic-undifferentiated waste (Viale 1999).  This 
capital intensification would lead to a waste of compactors’ space, and 
consequently of capital itself.  In Johannesburg’s case, service done by 21 
cubic metre compactors working on 240-litre bins is very expensive (three 
times the cost of normal bins and 25% more personnel and vehicle time 
(Swilling and Hutt 1999, 204).  Using compactors reduces capital effective-
ness due to traffic jams – quite common in a car-dependent city like Johan-
nesburg – and to long distance between landfills and residential areas. 
Organic waste, meanwhile, constitutes a high share of refuse produced 
in Johannesburg, approximately 35% in affluent areas and 20% in informal 
settlements.  The wasteful use of compactors is, once again, linked to over-
servicing of suburban lifestyles and patterns of consumption.  Important 
savings could be realised with a different organisation of refuse collection, 
compared to the current one encouraged by the link between the power 
of private contracting companies, high capital intensity and emphasis on 
individual consumption. 
An alternative could be provided by a process of differentiated col-
lection of organic waste, which can be collected more efficiently by 
municipal loader trucks and municipal workers in a more labour-intensive 
method.  This would save on capital expenses and provide for new oppor-
tunities for employment.  At the same time, the quality of employment 
would benefit as well.  In fact, the use of compactors reduces the contri-
bution of municipal workers to a mere manual input of loading bins, 
downgrading and dequalifying workers’ roles.  Incidentally, the use of 
local “entrepreneurs” in contexts where waste is dumped in open skip 
containers goes precisely in this direction of separating living labour from 
mechanised functions.  Employing municipal workers in a process based 
on separated collection of waste would facilitate more direct interaction 
between residents and workers, and employees would be restored to a 
function of offering expertise and advice and raising awareness about 
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more effective and environmentally sound collection practices necessary 
for such a system to work. 
Important to this latter scenario would be the garden sites, currently 
defined by the council as “non-income generating activities”, which could 
provide a decentralised, small-scale, community-based structure for dif-
ferentiated collection; recycling (with the economic activities associated 
with this); and composting.  This would be all the more effective if garden 
site services were provided free of charge and cross-subsidised.  Finally, 
waste reduction at the source would increase, reducing the overloading of 
landfills and water contaminating leachates.  
In all these activities, new opportunities for employment would be 
combined with denser links between workers and communities which 
emphasise the “knowledge” component of the waste collection job (Viale 
1999, 74).  This would also strengthen workers’ positions, create better jobs 
and be conducive to a culture of the public service that could facilitate, for 
example, environmentally sensitive aspects such as accumulation of illegal 
dumping with all its associated costs. 
It is therefore striking that the business plans for the new waste manage-
ment utility – while rhetorically advocating the importance of recycling and 
source reduction – do not consider these issues in any detail.  Rather, the 
profit-making rationale of the new utility, combined with the dubious dis-
tinctions of “income generating” versus “non-income generating” services, 
supercedes social and environmental concerns.  The result is a series of 
assumptions, which really amount to leaps of faith, that business efficiency 
will somehow translate into better practices in these areas. 
MUNICIPAL WORKERS AND CASUALISATION: 
Towards an Authoritarian Management style
The historically high numbers of casual workers in the waste service of Johannesburg (30% of the total municipal workforce in 2000, but in some depots as in the EMLC, the Inner City and Soweto, this figure rises to 60-70%) constitute a ‘buffer zone’ of numerical 
flexibility.  This has allowed the service to deal with varying collection 
frequency in different areas of the city, seasonal variations and costly 
interventions resulting from the disruption of the service, as in the case of 
illegal dumping.  The GJMC’s labour relations specialist, former unionist 
Makgane Thobejane,5 argues that the use of casuals will be reduced by the 
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new utility in a long-term process of “quality jobs” creation and consolida-
tion of employment relationships as a result of the “rationalisation” of 
the service.  However, decentralised managers in charge of the implementa-
tion of the programme hold different views.  Roelf de Beer, for example, 
Executive Officer for Waste Management in the WMLC, and the person 
responsible for the implementation of the utility’s business plan, explicitly 
mentioned the possibility of easier access to casual labour as one of the 
advantages of the new structure, due to the fact that business imperatives 
would make such employment forms more acceptable than in the case of 
the GJMC as an owner subject to political pressures.6 
Casual and temporary workers are usually hired at the gate or ferried 
in trucks between depots according to daily requirements.  In particular, 
the depots of Selby (SMLC) and Marlboro (NMLC) are used as main sorting 
centres for casuals, which indicates a rationalisation and centralisation of 
recruitment, compared to hiring at each individual depots’ gates.  In Soweto 
this function is performed by the Diepmeadow depot, which also sends its 
casuals to other parts of the NMLC.  While municipal workers generally 
report an increase in casualisation over the past five years, this is related 
to policies implemented at the level of MLCs.  In particular, workers at the 
NMLC report that casuals generally replace permanent workers who retire 
(the large Waterval depot has lost 100 permanent jobs in this way).  Casuals 
have no formal contract, are not notified of their employment duration, are 
not covered by GJMC’s benefits (medical aid, provident fund and housing 
scheme) and their duration of employment can be as short as a single day.  
The contracts of temporary workers (equally excluded from GJMC’s benefits, 
but employed at the same wage rates as GJMC workers) can be renewed 
for as long as six months to one year before they become permanent.  
(Shop stewards interviewed for this report give different estimates of casuals’ 
remunerations, however, ranging from R35 to R45 per day (compared to 
approximately R60 for GJMC’s street cleaners)).  The decision to hire casuals 
is in the hands of the depot’s manager who – sometimes after consultation 
with shop stewards, but lack of consultation remains a major source of 
complaint – is required to obtain authorisation from the MLC’s technical 
service department, and is funded by the depot’s budget. 
Casuals perform repetitive, labour-intensive activities (such as street 
cleaning and “boppas”, or plastic bags delivery, which are done entirely 
by hand or manual tools).  Therefore there seems not to be a disincentive 
for the new utility in employing them, also given that they can provide a 
vulnerable counterpart to the unionised workforce.  In this regard, the range 
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of activities in which casuals are used seems to be increasing.  According to 
workers from the Avalon depot (Klipspruit, near Soweto) casuals from other 
depots are required to do nightshifts in recent extensions of Lenasia, which 
is under Avalon’s jurisdiction, therefore replacing local workers.  These 
changes have taken place without consultation with workers and reflect a 
growing unilateralism in decisions to employ flexible work. 
This trend towards an authoritarian redefinition of employment rela-
tionships is facilitated by long-term budget problems that encourage the 
recruitment of casuals.  It also introduces a new scenario in worker-
management power relations, one which increases worker vulnerability in 
a way that will likely have significant impacts in the new utility.  The use of 
adverse budget contingencies as a vehicle for creeping and more structural 
changes in employment and production organisation is confirmed by work-
ers’ experiences of subcontracting.
Historically, subcontracting has been largely limited to compactor 
trucks, usually with a driver and an assistant.  Contract lengths vary from 
6 months for ad hoc contracts linked to peak times to up to four years.  
In 2000, 34 out of 49 contracts signed by the council (for a value of 
R62 million out of R 94.5 million in total contracts, 25% of the operating 
budget) are for vehicles and maintenance, followed at a distance by 
street cleaning and bin liners.  In the past, contracts were started by 
the MLCs after consultation with the depots’ managers.  The GJMC has 
tried to rationalise contracting operations, relying on fewer suppliers and 
minimising the currently high level of ad hoc contracts due to downtime 
of municipal trucks. 
The scenario of an increased use of partnerships with the private 
sector in the provision of vehicles, plants and fleet management poses 
many questions.  First, as has been highlighted in the literature on other 
municipal services (Van Niekerk et al. 1999), the need for the private 
contractor to recoup all costs can have negative effects on tariff rates and 
accessibility for the poor.  Second, there is the possibility of ‘cherry pick-
ing’: contractors privileging relatively affluent areas with well-organised 
collection facilities, leaving a depleted council’s fleet to attend to poorer 
neighbourhoods and informal settlements.  Third, subcontracting could 
produce further downward pressures on wages, working conditions and 
employment levels.  From this point of view, the Executive Officer for 
Waste Management in the WMLC, who defines the current wage levels 
and the 40-hour working week “the biggest threat to our survival”, recog-
nises that subcontracting has the merit of achieving a higher degree of 
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downward wage and time flexibility.7
Workers’ experiences with subcontracting confirm an accentuation and 
acceleration of authoritarian methods of employment restructuring along 
with the rise of the new utility.  Particularly resented (and a major cause of 
work stoppages and not infrequent physical confrontation between council 
and contract workers) is the recent introduction of contract work in “non-
traditional” areas.  This includes street cleaning, which in many communi-
ties provides an important job opportunity for unskilled workers, and the 
use of contract drivers on council trucks, even for a few days or weeks.  
Shop stewards report that these changes are usually introduced without 
consultation or information disclosure. 
Reorganisation of Tasks and Functions
Managerial discourse also links the utility concept to strategies of ‘multi-
skilling’ and a more efficient utilisation of machinery, plant and equip-
ment.  Important in this regard is the aim to reduce worker-to-truck ratios.  
“Teams” are organised to operate on trucks as they become available 
for collection rounds, which implies flexible starting times.  This arrange-
ment, previously required by the high number of trucks in maintenance 
that cannot be serviced due to budget constraints, is likely to become a 
structural feature of work organisation.  In this way workers will have to 
face both longer inactive periods and a higher daily and weekly spread 
of working hours. 
The organisation of collection teams in this service varies according to 
depots, councils and geographical areas (Swilling and Hutt 1999, 202-3).  
Traditionally, refuse compactor trucks are serviced by nine council workers 
and a supervisor; five workers (“loaders”) load onto the truck refuse bags 
carried by refuse removers to specified collection points and four workers 
(the boppas) distribute plastic bags to the houses.  Areas that were not 
previously part of the Johannesburg City Council can present variations to 
this scheme.  In Soweto, refuse is usually loaded from the houses without 
a collection point and often with no plastic bags.  In this case teams may 
be bigger (six loaders and four workers bringing bins or bags on the side of 
the road from each user’s house).  Boppas and refuse removers are driven 
in advance to the collection areas by council trucks, which also transport 
street cleaners. 
However, this structure has undergone significant changes in the past 
two years.  The scarcity of functioning council trucks (the Norwood depot, 
for example, had its trucks reduced from 24 to five between 1995 and 
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1999) has led to an increase in the size of teams, which are supposed 
to cover larger areas than before, resulting in increased workloads.  This 
situation is complicated by the shortage of the most basic instruments, such 
as protective clothing, brooms, shovels and forks; a shortage lamented by 
many workers.  Currently, teams can be made of as many as 14 workers, 
while street cleaners have seen their areas expanded to both sides of 
streets, where previously two cleaners would work together.  At the Avalon 
depot, teams can have as many as 32 members, doing the amount of 
collection previously done by three teams of about 16 people.  
Following the establishment of new municipal boundaries and the 
MLCs, geographical areas covered by many depots have increased through 
a process of deployment that allowed recently acquired extensions of the 
city to be redistributed among different depots.  The absence of funds 
to provide more workers and trucks has contributed to increasing work 
intensification, as shown by the case of Orange Farm, serviced by only 
two municipality trucks, compared to the 17 available to the Waterval 
depot, in the affluent North.  This problem is particularly serious in the 
informal settlements, especially in the southern part of the municipality.  
Moreover, waste collection by municipal workers is met by resistance 
from informal settlement residents.  In a survivalist economy, waste is an 
important resource and its control provides income opportunities, albeit 
marginal.  Samwu members blame this situation on local councillors 
who, “playing gambles with our lives”, as one worker put it, attempt to 
build patronage and support networks in informal settlements by promising 
employment opportunities in “community-based” schemes. 
The increase in areas and workloads has led to a substantial and 
regular accumulation of unfinished jobs that are usually attended to either 
after working hours (often unpaid) or the following day, which tends to 
reproduce and enlarge the problem.  This situation is often created by the 
fact that workers have to start their round with delays of up to two hours 
(when waste starts to rot and smell) due to the unavailability of trucks.  
At the same time, accumulating uncollected waste leads to residents’ 
complaints and conflict with council workers.  Shortages of trucks have in 
particular penalised dedicated services for garden sites.  Given that this job 
is now done by contract trucks after their normal round, garden sites are 
unattended for longer periods of time (frequency of service often declining 
from once a day to twice a week), during which they become full and 
have to be locked.  This often creates further tension between workers and 
residents, leading at the same time to an increase in illegal dumping and 
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scavengers, who in turn collide with municipal workers for the control of 
the refuse.  Many municipal workers have reported personal accounts of 
violent conflicts with residents, including stabbings and the use of firearms. 
Five years of increasing flexibility in employment and working condi-
tions coupled with stringent fiscal austerity has increasingly separated 
workers from the communities, rather than re-qualifying their social and 
environmental role.  Multi-tasking has also contributed to a disappearance 
of specific features and competencies in individual jobs, blurring the 
distinction between tasks that are often performed simultaneously, deepen-
ing a generalised deskilling.  Lack of investment in new trucks and the 
restructuring of teams have provided new strategic weapons with which 
the council has exercised renewed pressures on the material conditions 
of its workers.  In particular, these processes have provided justifications 
for management’s choices not to replace relatively high-wage employees, 
such as drivers and supervisors, choosing instead to use “acting” personnel 
taken from lower grades, but without a remuneration corresponding to 
their new tasks.  At the same time this use of “acting” personnel in 
supervisory and team leader positions is enabled by a general deskilling 
of the job, encouraged by mechanised compacting devices provided by 
private contractors (i.e., supervisory roles are becoming less challenging). 
Far from having teams performing operations requiring multiple com-
petencies and knowledge of socio-environmental processes, the council 
largely employs teams of low-wage, multi-tasked, semi-skilled workers in 
highly routinised functions.  This will likely impact negatively on workers’ 
perspectives for change and sense of collective power, in a sector already 
characterised by historical vulnerabilitites.  Waste management employees in 
Johannesburg are, in fact, to a significant degree a product of the apartheid 
low-wage economy and migrant labour system.  They have been in munici-
pal employment for long periods of time, their average age is high and 
many of them still reside in municipal hostels while maintaining strong rural 
links.  The devices put in place by apartheid to reduce reproduction costs, 
especially the compound system, still exert a downward pressure on their 
wages, and reinforce the municipality’s position in collective bargaining. 
The career opportunities for most refuse workers are equally narrow, 
ranging from boppas or street cleaner positions whose wage is R1 100-1 
200/month after deductions, to extremely rare opportunities to become a 
driver for R4 000/month before deductions.  The sections of this working 
class that are more established in the urban areas and can access related 
patterns of consumption, find these wage levels inadequate to cope with 
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living expenses (especially of a fixed kind such as bonds, water, electricity, 
education, transport).  Virtually all the workers interviewed for this report 
who permanently live in Gauteng declared that they are unable to save 
money at the end of the month, and most explained that they incur new 
debts regularly.  Migrant workers have a higher saving rate for remittances 
in totally impoverished rural areas thanks to low rentals in the hostels 
(where as many as 10 people have to share one room) and by refusing to 
join medical aid schemes, which deprives them of any medical coverage.
The perception of iGoli 2001 as a programme of restructuring that 
reinforces a neo-liberalised, low-wage economy makes workers feel even 
more vulnerable.  Many of them retain idealised views of an era before 
the establishment of the GJMC and the MLCs, acronyms that represent for 
them a distant, dismissive, arrogant and authoritarian management.  Some 
even go so far as saying they miss the days of the Johannesburg City 
Council and the racially separated municipal structures, represented as a 
period in which workers were at least trained, instructions were fair and 
“management was talking to the people”.   
Historical views aside, most workers express a growing sense of pow-
erlessness and disillusionment with the present government.  As a street 
sweeper and Samwu shop steward from Avalon depot put it:
It’s my government who I have voted for.  It said we are going to live in 
peace and harmony in our country.  Now I see only fear and crisis, and 
it is our government who is creating all these things.  This government 
is hitting us as the working class.  What I see is privatisation…and this 
will go back to the days of apartheid.  One person is going to make the 
job of ten people: that is privatisation.  We thought we’re going back to 
Canaan, but they’re bringing us back to Egypt.
These feelings represent and confirm the crucial argument, developed 
throughout this paper, that to understand municipal services restructuring 
in Johannesburg, and waste management in particular, the GJMC’s techni-
cal and managerial rationality of corporate restructuring has to be located 
in its historical context.  This is marked by class conflict, uneven urban 
development and authoritarian restructuring.  Rather than seeing iGoli 
2002 as a point of clear separation from a past characterised by budget 
deficits, inefficiency and ad hoc crisis management, it is necessary to look 
at the long-term socio-economic continuities that bind that past and the 
current transition to the Pikitup utility.  In particular, the modifications in 
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forms of work and employment defined during the past five years have 
not just been part of a contingent response to budgetary crisis.  They 
have defined a pattern of flexibility and worker disempowerment and 
devaluation, even of their physical lives.  
Five years of neoliberal crisis management have fundamentally eroded 
existing forms of worker identity, strength, knowledge and solidarity with 
communities.  These results provide strategic advantages for the new 
utility’s corporate strategies and profit-based approach to service delivery.  
The rhetorical commitment by Pikitup’s management to eliminate the 
undesirable consequences of the old system – such as wasteful ad hoc 
contracts, illegal dumping and ineffective income generation – does not 
obscure the fact that for workers and communities the transition to the age 
of independent utilities in service delivery takes place under particularly 
adverse social conditions. 
Conclusion:
New Canaan, New Egypt
This report has provided an assessment of the trajectories and pros-pects facing waste management in the new Johannesburg unicity and locates the current restructuring in social, economic and geographical context.  A very influential literature, predominantly 
of a management studies nature, has come to understand the crisis of 
services in the city as one determined mainly by technical factors such as 
a lack of organisational integration, economic inefficiency and inadequate 
“communication” with the serviced communities (see, for example, Swill-
ing and Hutt 1999).  Such analyses legitimise a reading of fiscal austerity 
enforced especially in the 1997-2000 period as an exercise in emergency 
management in the context of limited resources due to policies of contain-
ment of expenditure enforced at the national and provincial levels.  More 
nuanced views along this line define the “emergency” in social terms, by 
mentioning the rapid growth of urbanisation as an important factor in the 
current challenges.  In these views “rapid urbanisation” as a social problem 
usually refers to black areas of the city. 
Even if the impact of neoliberal policies at a central government level 
is decisive, notions like “limited resources” and “rapid urbanisation” tend 
to reify in unproblematic and self-fulfilling ways what are actually deeply 
contested social processes of unequal allocation of resources.  Worse than 
that, such views end up placing undue blame on residents for failures in 
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service delivery, often resorting to spurious socio-psychological categories 
such as “ignorance” and “apathy” as features inherent in the mass psychol-
ogy of rate defaulters.  These arguments have been debunked by a recent 
literature that emphasises how non-payment can be understood in terms 
of everyday political strategies and forms of resistance that express the 
unacceptability of urban living conditions (Desai 2000). 
Municipal workers are particularly vulnerable in this scenario, since 
they are made to pay twice.  First, as members of poor communities they 
have access to relatively expensive services that are downgraded by the 
systematic siphoning of the city’s resources to feed the most affluent areas 
of the city.  Second, the form that restructuring has taken clearly goes 
in the direction of devaluing workers’ power, remuneration, knowledge 
and organised strength.  At the same time, the neoliberal restructuring 
of waste management does not address social inequalities, promote an 
environmentally sensitive service, or link ecological standards to employ-
ment creation and workers’ skills.  In this sense, waste management 
can become a litmus test for the whole entrepreneurial ideologising that 
underpins the iGoli 2002 project. 
Current trends towards higher capital intensity in refuse collection 
and routinisation/downgrading of workers’ inputs may help to make the 
new waste utility profitable, but it is neither necessary nor more efficient 
from an economic point of view, less preferable environmentally and 
ineffective from the point of view of service integration.  Acknowledging 
these contradictions, and accepting the possibility of re-invigorating public 
sector workers and resources, is the first step towards developing concrete 
policy alternatives.
ENDNOTES
1 Interview with Hlubi Byiana, Samwu Johannesburg branch organiser, April 17, 
2000.
2 All estimates quoted hereinafter are author’s elaborations based on GJMC statis-
tics.
3 SMLC Executive Committee Decision, April 26, 2000.
4 Yet costs of improving this situation would be far less than prohibitive. Swilling 
and Hutt (1999, 205) calculate that providing plastic bags to shacks would cost 
R13.50 per stand, which would amount to an additional expenditure for the 
municipality of R675 000. This represents only 0.17% of the waste management 
operating budget for 1999-2000.
5 Author’s interview, March 16, 2000.
6 Author’s interview, October 19, 1999.
7 Author’s interview, October 19, 1999.
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